Storch for District Court Judge

Supreme Court Decides Caperton v. Massey

On June 9, 2009, the United State Supreme Court handed down a decision on Caperton v. Massey, a case involving a West Virginia Supreme Court Judge who refused to recuse himself despite receiving campaign donations from one of the parties appearing before him.  With the exception of a few judicial websites, like the Brennan Center for Justice, commentary and discussion regarding the consequences of this ruling have been remiss.

What happened in Caperton v. Massey?

In Massey, an attorney, Brent Benjamin, was running for a Supreme Court Justice seat in West Virginia.  Because contributions made to his campaign committee exceeded 3 million dollars, he was able to run an all-out mud slinging campaign against the then seated judge, Warren McGraw.  What is important to note is that these contributions were made by the C.E.O. of A.T. Massey Coal Company.

A.T. Massey Coal Co. was subsequently involved in a law suit filed by Hugh Caperton, of Harman Mining.  The  jury found in favor of Caperton and awarded $50 million in damages.

The case was appealed and found itself in the West Virginia Supreme Court, before, guess who?  Judge Benjamin.  Of course, Caperton petitioned to have judge Benjamin recuse himself from the case, given the large contributions made by A.T. Massey’s C.E.O..  Benjamin declined and was ultimately part of the 3 to 2 majority that overturned the $50 million verdict.

Caperton appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy called the appearance of conflict of interest so “extreme” that Benjamin’s failure to recuse himself constituted a threat to the plaintiff’s Constitutional right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court also noted that “Not every campaign contribution by a litigant or attorney creates a probability of bias that requires a judge’s recusal, but this is an exceptional case. We conclude that there is a serious risk of actual bias—based on objective and reasonable perceptions—when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by raising funds or directing the judge’s election campaign when the case was pending or imminent.”

“The inquiry,” Justice Kennedy wrote, “centers on the contribution’s relative size in comparison to the total amount of money contributed to the campaign, the total amount spent in the election, and the apparent effect such contribution had on the outcome of the election.”

Applying that test, Justice Kennedy ruled for the Court that “Blankenship’s significant and disproportionate influence—coupled with the temporal relationship between the election and the pending case—”‘ “offer a possible temptation to the average . . . judge to . . . lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true.”‘ “On these extreme facts the probability of actual bias rises to an unconstitutional level.”

What are the Implications of this Ruling?

Some states are instituting limitations on local judges, e.g., District Court Judges, requiring them to recuse themselves from hearing any case where either party has contributed more than a specified threshold amount to that judge’s campaign.  Texas, for example, has set that amount to $1,000.00 for smaller districts and $2,500 for larger ones.

Other states have introduced legislation to prevent candidates for District Court Judge from accepting any monetary donations by changing the process from an electoral one to one by appointment.

Implications for Durham

District Court campaigns in Durham have historically spent tens of thousands of dollars, with some recent campaigns reaching more than thirty thousand dollars.  This is a relatively small amount compared to the millions that are raised for statewide positions.  But by comparison, contributions made by some local attorneys reach significant percentage of the total campaign budget.  For example, in one recent campaign, the judicial candidate raised approximately ten thousand dollars.  One local attorney contributed $750 to that campaign, which amounts to a substantial 7.5% contribution.

It is hard to believe that the judicial candidate won’t remember that significant contribution when that attorney appears in that judge’s courtroom after the election.

I have promised to not accept campaign contributions from anyone for exactly the reasons brought to light by Caperton v. Massey.  This is the policy I have adopted at the outset of my campaign back in 2008, long before the ruling of the Supreme Court.  Not because it merely avoids the appearance of impropriety but because it is the morally correct thing to do and the only way to preserve judicial fairness, integrity, and objectivity.

And I challenge my opposition to do the same.

Want to know where my opposition’s money is coming from?  Click here

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